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Market for Corporate Control and Contractual Buyout (CoBO): A New 
“Collective Ownership-and-Administrative” Strategy 
 
ABSTRACT 
Contractual buyout (CoBO) is a new “collective ownership and joint administrative 
strategy”, which gives an opportunity to buy a target firm in the given period when the given 
contract ends between acquirer, target firm, and financier. It is a takeover defensive method 
and tends to avail tax advantage via entering CoBO deal. In particular, it would be efficient 
inorganic magnetic for international venture capitalists and private equity firms while 
entering foreign markets. More specifically, CoBO is likely a concept of Dating-before-
Merging and it would be the better model for cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
integration strategy. The explored CoBO propositions may be useful in various implications 
such as information symmetry and administrative changes, employment and employee role, 
operating performance and financial arrangement, tax savings, choice of market entry 
strategy, integration strategy, and government and policy makers. We recommend the 
developed country investors choose CoBO as investment vehicle to avail the competent 
business opportunities in both emerging and budding economies. 
JEL Classification: G34; G38; M48 
Keywords: Contractual buyout; Collective ownership; Inorganic strategy; Leveraged 
buyout; Market for corporate control; Mergers and acquisitions; Strategic alliances, 
Takeovers.  
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Why are takeovers necessary to shrink declining industries? The easy answers such as 
managers do not want to lose their jobs’ are not satisfactory. A CEO with a golden parachute 
might end up richer by closing redundant plants than by keeping them open. 
– Lambrecht and Myers (2007: 810) 
INTRODUCTION 
The splendor of Contractual Buyout (hereafter, CoBO) is a new “collective-
ownership-administrative” strategy, which is designed to protect, and clinic sick units as well 
as gain the corporate control in the form of a takeover (if desired), and then achieve post-
merger integration difficulties. We develop this model under the principles of leveraged 
buyouts (hereafter, LBO), and collective ownership and control. However, our model is 
similar to the market for corporate control activities, such as, mergers and acquisitions 
(hereafter, M&A), takeovers, buyouts, and so forth (e.g., Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
1
 In the 
circumstances of low economic growth, buyouts would be effective tool while undertaking 
necessary policy reforms to focus on core business operations (Wright, Kitamura, and 
Hoskisson, 2003). 
We frame the study by drawing on studies, such as, choice among mergers, 
acquisitions, alliances, collaborations, greenfield investments, joint ventures, and divestitures 
(e.g., Anand and Delios, 2002; Ariño and Ring, 2010; Elango and Pattnaik, 2011; Fjeldstad, 
Snow, Miles, and Lettl, 2012; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 
2009; Moschieri, 2011; Reddy, 2015b, 2015c; Slangen, 2011; Villalonga and Mcgahan, 2005; 
Wright, Kroll, Lado, and Ness, 2002). We also review the studies on restructuring, 
diversification, and performance (e.g., Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Wan, 2003; Chakrabarti, Singh, 
and Mahmood, 2007; Makhija, 2004; Matusik and Fitza, 2012; Miller, 2006; Oh and 
                                                          
1
 The authors review the extent studies on market for corporate control, and document that takeovers generate 
positive margins, which bidding firm shareholders do not lose where as target firm shareholders are benefited. 
Also, see Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, and Davison (2009) for the extensive review on extant 
merger literature. 
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Contractor, 2012), and opportunities in corporate entrepreneurship (e.g., Madhok and 
Keyhani, 2012; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2010; Simsek and Heavey, 2011). We further select 
the studies on emerging multinationals, and their strategies reported by academic researchers 
in the recent years (e.g., Brannen and Voisey, 2012; de la Torre and Chacar, 2012; 
Govindarajan and Ramamurti, 2011; Peng, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012; Reddy, 2015a, 2015d; 
Westney, 2011). The above studies are being helped in research setting, theory building, and 
framework designing of this paper. 
The 1980’s initial buyout waves in the U.S.A. and UK have engulfed emerging 
economies to create a common platform for inorganic growth, especially M&As and buyout 
fields. Contextually, LBO is a debt-collateral-acquisition transaction between an acquirer, 
and target firm. The prime motive behind LBO deal is to transfer stakeholders’ wealth and 
tax gains; others include incentive realignment, and utilization of private information. During 
1985-2005 in the UK, there were 12,267 buyouts of which 1,431(12%) noticed protection 
from creditors (CMBOR, 2006 in [Cumming, Siegel, and Wright, 2007]).
2
 In the USA 
between 2004 and 2007, US $535billion worth of LBOs completed, which was more than 10 
times of the US $50billion over the previous 8 years during 1996-2003 (Shivdasani and 
Wang, 2011). Whereas during 2007 financial crisis, both volume, and value of cross-border 
deals has plummeted in the western and developing nations, and then continued until 2009-10 
(see UNCTAD, 2009, 2010). Economically and politically, largest LBOs are likely to have 
more impact on the economy (Opler, 1992). Earlier research describes various buyout 
models, and notices that momentous growth in operating competence and profitability during 
post-buyout period. However, either the engulfed LBO models, and guidelines does not suit 
the need, and requirement of industrial houses in emerging, and third world nations or they 
have become overloaded.  
                                                          
2
 The buyout market has all the time been striking by modernism in financial products, and financing 
arrangements. Hence, this trend seems to be different from vertical strip financing (Cumming et al., 2007). 
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CoBO is a twofold-secured debt obligation, joint administration, and opportunity to 
buy target unit in the given period between acquirer, target firm, and financier in the market 
for corporate control. In particular, CoBO would be efficient inorganic magnetic for 
international venture capitalists, and private equity firms as a part of foreign market entry 
strategy. Specifically, it regulates unhealthy competition through monitoring monopoly 
activities. More specifically, it is a kind of contractual relationship (Dating-before-Merging), 
choice of market entry and expansion, and possibility to obtain tax advantage. Largely, it 
secures, and sustains more number of sick units to promise sustainable life for the citizens of 
country. More importantly, CoBO shall be the best-fit model for cross-border M&A 
integration strategy. We explore policy implications, and develop CoBO propositions with 
reference to rigorous earlier contributions in the M&A and buyouts field. CoBO propositions 
are useful in various implications, such as information symmetry and administrative changes, 
employment and employee role, operating performance and financial arrangement, tax 
savings, choice of market entry strategy, integration strategy and government and policy 
makers. Besides, firms can use CoBO as a takeover defensive strategy. To ensure state 
ownership on government enterprises, and protect sick companies in this global competition 
era, we introduce a model that would sustain the economic life of sick industries, and 
condense the monopoly power. Further, CoBO framework has illustrated through the virtual 
case, and recommending the government to enact new regulation in light of competition and 
trade. In case of non-enactment, we suggest the state for setting-up a committee to ensure 
better economic health, and uphold the ownership and control on government undertakings.  
This article thus responds to the call issued by Lambrecht and Myers (2007), shows 
directions to develop an original model for benefiting the declining industries in emerging 
economies group. We aim to fill the void by answering an abstract query that does it possible 
to facilitate contract-clinic to sick industries in the M&A and disinvestment perspective. 
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However, the theory of takeovers and disinvestment suggested by Lambrecht and Myers 
(2007) mainly suits the advanced economies rather third world nations. Therefore,  CoBO – a 
policy framework has developed on the foundations laid via the existence of partial mergers 
in Japan (e.g., Akhigbe, Madura, and Spencer, 2004), LBO transactions in the Russian 
Federation (Kasparova, 2007), motivations for leveraged buyouts (Opler and Titman, 1991), 
role of buyouts in restructuring Central and Eastern Europe (Wright, Filatotchev, and Buck, 
1993), consequences of LBOs (Bull, 1989; Fox and Marcus, 1992; Krause, 1989), buyout 
decisions in the UK (Weir, Lating, and Wright, 2005), and board structure and value creation 
in buyouts (Barun and Latham, 2007, 2009). Exclusive studies include hostage theory of joint 
ventures and partial acquisitions (Chen and Hennart, 2004), and employment effects and 
smaller LBOs (Amess and Wright, 2012). We then state our contribution to the study. 
Motivation and contribution of the study 
The conceptual foundation of this paper builds on four notions. First, the growing 
importance of emerging economies and their contribution to the universal trade, and 
commerce suggest that changing models of the global business situation motivate emerging 
country multinationals for improving network coordination and performance (e.g., de la Torre 
and Chacar, 2012; Peng, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012; Westney, 2011). Second, academic 
contributions on various key issues such as restructuring economies, synergies of alliances, 
partnerships, M&A, and buyouts in diverse institutional environments notice that acquisition, 
alliance, collaboration, or buyout alternatives improve corporate growth especially in larger 
firms (e.g., Elango and Pattnaik, 2011; Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Slangen, 2011; Wang and 
Zajac, 2007; Wiersema and Liebeskind, 1995). Third, studies on foreign market entry 
strategies in various societal settings describe that acquisitions, greenfiled investments, and 
buyouts are important entry modes in emerging nations (e.g., Chen and Hennart, 2004; 
Harzing, 2002; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Meyer et al., 2009; Reddy et al., 2014a, 2014b; 
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Wright et al., 2002). Fourth, increased of awareness, and budding research on corporate 
entrepreneurship in the last decade report that buyouts create opportunities thus improves 
financial performance via entrepreneurship mode (e.g., Ragozzino and Reuer, 2010; Zahra, 
1991). In sum, these outcomes have been motivated in theoretical building, and framework 
setting to our study. In addition to this, Fox and Marcus (1992) suggest that the current 
research in buyouts dreadfully deficient in multiplicity of conducts, henceforth more research 
require that passably judge the consequences of any new type of transaction. More 
specifically, Fox and Marcus (1992) research work has inspired us to develop new inorganic-
strategy array that would improve the economic life of declining industries whilst adding new 
buyout model of CoBO to the existing theories, and hypotheses. In particular, Ramamurti 
(2012: 42) recommends that how the home-country setting motivates emerging multinational 
enterprises for corporate ownership and control advantage would be possible theme of 
advanced research. In other words, both demand and supply side issues may likely establish 
the concert of multinationals (Drummond, 2012). Therefore, the corporations for sustainable 
business may require new methods, and approaches (e.g., Khandwalla, 2002). Consequently, 
we have considered their recommendations while designing CoBO model.  
Our article makes three contributions to the literature on acquisitions and buyouts, 
corporate entrepreneurship, and international business.
3
 First, CoBO framework is other side 
of the mergers and buyouts theories, which would append a couple of propositions for 
ensuring future research from budding strategy scholars in this field. Second, CoBO policy 
implications eventually motivate venture capitalists, and private equity players that they 
would preferably purse corporate entrepreneurship in new institutional dimensions. At the 
end, the suggested few insights in CoBO theory may inspire global corporate giants while 
choosing foreign market entry strategies, and it would be greater mix of hypotheses to the 
                                                          
3
 For information purpose, and cause benefitting the strategy researchers, we have discussed strategic aspects, 
but not financial aspects of the proposed CoBO framework. However, we have recommended few existing 
contributions in the subsequent sections of this paper that would help both economics and finance scholars.  
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existing international business literature. An additional contribution of our paper is to 
document policy issues, and regulatory provisions of CoBO framework in light of legal and 
institutional context, and to the literature on market for corporate control.  
The remaining article unfolds as follows. We begin the paper by selectively reviewing 
the existing research related to inorganic choices varying from alliances to LBOs. Thereafter, 
we describe the research setting, and theory building. We then present the proposed CoBO 
framework, followed by propositions, and conclude with a set of guidelines for future 
research. 
 
REVIEW OF EXISTING STUDIES 
Strategy, Law, Finance, and Economics research fields have been examined the 
diverse challenges associated with alliances, acquisitions, collaborations, divestitures, 
mergers, takeovers and so forth, usually ranging from negotiations to post-strategy actions. 
Notably, M&A literature has grown by the orders of magnitude since Joel Segall published in 
1968 (cf. Lambrecht and Myers, 2007). Lambrecht and Myers describe M&A in two broad 
classes. First, exploit synergies and growth opportunities; second, seek greater efficiency 
through layoffs, consolidation, and disinvestment. We therefore present CoBO policy 
framework from the second class of M&A field. Most studies found that M&A seen as a 
means to maximize market share, geographical expansion, realize economies of scale, and so 
forth (e.g., Valentini, 2012).
4
 
In a recent study, Pe’er and Gottschalg (2011) define that LBO is standalone, 
acquiring substantial shares of a company (or, a division) from its owners, typically with a 
limited time horizon, financed through a mix of equity and debt, and with robust participation 
from specialized banking institutions. In other words, when the acquisition financed largely 
                                                          
4
 Valentini (2012) explores the effect of merger on the patenting quantity, and quality of the firms involved in a 
deal; thus M&A appears to be followed by significant decline in patents’ impact, originality, and generality.  
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by borrowing of all the stock, or assets of a hitherto public company by a small group of 
investors is also termed as LBO. In specific circumstances, LBOs occur when a firm is ‘taken 
private’ – the company’s equity bought up and then delisted from publicly traded security 
markets (Fox and Marcus 1992). A firm with low debt-equity ratio would be well match for 
LBO deal, enchanting on substantial amount of debt (Loh, 1992).  
In the earlier versions, LBO was a practice by which the owner/founder seeking to 
cash-out his investment transferred the firm to manage or younger family members, who can 
put up a small amount of capital, and borrow the rest (Kosedag, Mehran, and Qian, 2009). 
There are relevant studies on LBOs include cost savings, exchange listing, and tax savings 
(Bull, 1989; Landsman, Shackelford, and Yetman, 2002), agency costs (Shivdasani and 
Wang, 2011), free cash flows (Fox and Marcus, 1992), and informational advantages of 
managers (Opler and Titman, 1991). Moreover, LBO is most efficient in enhancing the 
oversight of the public firm without effective administrative control on firm operations 
(Bowman, Singh, Useem, and Bhadury, 1999). Most explanations for LBOs are based on 
trade-off theories of capital structure, and they create value via interest tax shields, lower 
agency costs, and operational improvements (Shivdasani and Wang, 2011). Further, Opler 
and Titman (1991) describe motivations for LBOs include incentive realignment, exploitation 
of inside information, stakeholder wealth transfer, and tax gains. In particular, Fox and 
Marcus (1992) document the causes and consequences of LBOs from two perspectives – 
economic perspective, and behavioral perspective. 
Historically, the concept of LBO was born in the nations of developed markets 
‘United States’.5 Thus, buyouts have major implications to the market for corporate control 
                                                          
5
 Historically, LBOs, and leveraged cash-outs (LCOs) are the next wave to the end of conglomerated mergers in 
1980s. Mergers have been proving significant increases in financial leverage by controlling the firm size and 
industry effects (e.g., Shrieves and Pashley, 1984; Weston, Chung, and Hoag, 1998). During the 1980s merger 
wave, corporate sector of the American economy was left with an enormous increase in debt/equity ratio 
(Jensen, 1984). On the other hand, LBO has become an increasingly frequent form of business streamlining. For 
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(Fahrholz and Loslein, 1991), and the concept has wide applicability for streamlining the 
enterprises. If buyout market is to widen, three main elements to be present, generation of 
buyout opportunities, infrastructure to complete business deal, and investors prospect to 
sensible their margins (Wright, Thompson, and Robbie, 1992). In western economies, earlier 
work has acknowledged three types of buyout: efficiency buyouts, revitalization buyouts, and 
entrepreneurial buyouts (Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, and Dial, 2000). Therefore, our model 
is part of the revitalization. The 1980s buyout waves followed by a peak in default rates of 
highly levered companies, and the pace of LBO activity reached new record levels. Further, it 
represent 5,000 worldwide deals completed during 2005-07 for US$ 1.6 billion have been 
occupied 30 per cent of deals, and 43 per cent of trade share to the cumulative historic since 
1980 (cf. Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). Evidently, LBO transactions support the notion that 
leveraged dealings produce synergistic value (Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song, 2011). 
Wright et al. (1993) analyze issues involved in the application of buyout concept and 
the role of reengineering Central and Eastern Europe’s economy. In the UK, buyouts 
normally occur in four kinds: complete enterprise buyouts, multiple buyouts on the breakup 
of a state form, buyouts on disinvestment of non-core activities, and buyouts of previously 
non-commercial governmental or quasi-governmental activities (Wright and Buck, 1992). 
Wright, Thompson, Robbie, and Starkey (1994) describe that the majority of buyouts in the 
West do keep their original structures for five years or more, observe significant minority 
changes after a buyout. In particular, public to private LBOs have been taking place in 
considerable volumes in Europe, Japan and other Asian economies (Siegel, Wright, and 
Filatotchev, 2011).  
In order to achieve the goal of study, we present empirical results of previous studies 
on LBOs operating performance. Previous studies strongly report that buyouts enhance 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
example, the biggest buyout of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg Kravis and Roberts & Co (KKR) for US $24.7billion 
occurred in 1989 (Loh, 1992). 
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financial performance (e.g., Kaplan, 1989). The evidence shows that after LBOs, there have 
been significant improvement in operating efficiency and profitability, and no decline in the 
expenditure for such attributes, i.e. maintenance, and advertising (Fox and Marcus, 1992). 
Peter F. Drucker states that the merged companies’ evaluation record is inadequate 
particularly conglomerate, with which they had little in common – an emblematic financial 
conglomerate. Only three out of ten acquirers do as well two years later as they did prior to 
the merger. Nevertheless, the evidence of companies that have been acquired in a hostile 
takeover is consistently dismal (Drucker, 1986 in [Bull, 1989]). Opler (1992) investigates the 
consequences of LBOs on operating performance of 44 going-private transactions completed 
during 1985-89 in the UK. His findings were not escorted by smaller operating improvements 
than observed in earlier transactions. 
Bull (1989) compares the management performance before and after LBOs; financial 
performance after the buyouts is superior compare to before the buyouts. The enhancement is 
superior to income tax savings alone. Similarly, impact of LBOs on 64 larger U.S. firms 
examined by Wiersema and Liebeskind (1995), supports that large LBOs tumbling divisions 
of business, diversification and expansion, and provides discipline, which leads to job waning 
to the larger extent. Some of the eminent scholars suspect that LBOs create substantial storm 
among academicians, industrials, and public policy makers (cf. Zahra, 1995). Zahra examine 
47 LBO deals, exhibit augmentation in the product enrichment, technology related alliances, 
R&D employee size and skills, and new business creation activities during post-LBO period. 
Contrary to the larger buyouts, smaller companies’ LBOs do not seem to depend 
greatly on disposing assets, or laying-off employees, instead, foremost changes in the smaller 
LBOs lie in the area of increased marketing, and revenue augmentation (Malone, 1989). 
Malone analyzes 56 LBOs during 1981-87, shows that small LBOs relatively protect from 
foreign competition. Specifically, Loh (1992) describes LBO firms have higher average 
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levels of debt, and operating efficiency before the buyout than do other firms. Roden and 
Lewellen (1995) consider a large sample of LBO transactions in the United States during 
1981-90. They found that financing package is intended scientifically respond to differences 
across firms, these are growth prospects, variability of their earnings, liquidity characteristics, 
and opportunity to achieve tax savings. Similarly, Krause (1989) describes that LBOs achieve 
remarkable success in return on investment, and value creation despite their borrowing costs 
are very high. In a recent study, Guo et al. (2011) examine 192 LBOs during 1990-2006, 
which are more unadventurously priced, and less levered than observations documented in 
the 1980s. Guo et al. report that, on average, the firms experience large increases in total 
value from the time of the buyout to their subsequent exit from a private equity firm’s 
portfolio, producing large returns to invested debt, and equity holders. More specifically, 
Pe’er and Gottschalg (2011) study the affect of the institutional context on buyout 
investments, propose that the formal, and informal institutional environment in ‘red’ states is 
more associated with the strategies through which investors create value than such a context 
is in ‘blue’ states.6 Amess and Wright (2012) analyze 533 LBO deals occurred during 1993-
2004, conduct systematic analysis enumerate the effect of private equity, and LBO 
supremacy on employment, find no job effects reliant on the size of the target firm.  
We then purposively present few studies on the restructuring, and turnaround effect in 
different institutional contexts. In the view of sick company’s turnaround effect, Khandwalla 
(2002) suggest seven sets of activities to develop four typologies of turnaround strategy based 
on retrenchment of people and technology up-gradation.
7
 Bruton et al. (2003) investigate the 
                                                          
6
 Pe’er and Gottschalg (2011) examine 10,746 U.S. buyout investments in 4,633 distinct target companies made 
by 2,396 different funds managed by 1,300 private equity firms during 1980-2003. The institutional setup in 
blue states (dominated by the Democratic Party) would create higher transaction costs related to the 
implementation of restructuring-oriented buyout value-generating strategies than the institutional setup in red 
states (dominated by the U.S. Republican Party). 
7
 Most of the studies in turnaround administration conclude that all typology efforts explored from work force 
reduction to orbit firms (cf. Robbins and Pearce, 1992). They classify turnaround strategy into an efficiency 
driven, and competition driven. 
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turnaround strategies of overseas Chinese firms in East Asia, the importance of relationships 
among business people constrain the applicability of prior U.S. research to East Asia. In a 
similar study, Makhija (2004) study 988 restructuring firms in Czech Republic found that 
restructuring significantly reduced the value of firms.
8
  
We now focus on the related literature that covers diversification, and divestitures in 
various institutional contexts. Miller (2006) states that conglomerate firms produce more 
value from technological diversity than do single segment firms, and perform superior as 
technological diversity increases. Chakrabarti et al. (2007) find that institutional 
environments, economic stability, and business group affiliation influence the outcomes of 
diversification.
9
 In a recent study, Matusik and Fitza (2012) examine diversification in the 
context of venture capital firms. Firms benefit from either low or high levels of 
diversification; moderate levels generate the weak results. However, contacts and connections 
are more important than competencies and technological abilities for determining the 
incentives and outcomes of diversification in such environments (Kock and Guillen, 2001). In 
a course of divestiture program, Moschieri (2011) describes that past-history alone would be 
inadequate for understanding the outcomes of divestitures; thus may also affect perceptions 
of divestiture feasibility.
10
 Similarly, Chakrabarti, Vidal, and Mitchell (2011) examine 
reconfiguration activity of 1,256 firms based in eight South-East Asian economies; argue that 
more developed infrastructure facilitates resource reconfiguration, assisting weak firms’ 
attempts to retrench and strong firms’ attempts to grow. The above all helped us in research 
setting and theory building, which will be presented in the next section. 
                                                          
8
 In few institutional environments, for example, a spin-off occurs when a firm distributes controlling stock in a 
subsidiary to the current equity investors of the parent firm, whereas a ‘carve-out’ refers to a division of a firm, 
which is sold to new equity investors, or to a different firm.  
9
 Chakrabarti et al. (2007) study the impact of diversification on performance for 3,117 firms in six Asian 
countries (Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand) during 1988-2003. Results 
evidence that diversification negatively influences the outcome in more developed institutional environments 
while improving performance only in the least developed environments. 
10
 Divested units are more likely to perform better if the divesting process is cleverly managed; however, it 
depends on the involvement of unit managers, and on the creation of an independent firm with a new identity 
and strategy (Moschieri, 2011). 
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RESEARCH SETTING (THEORY BUILDING) – A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 
We review the exhaustive literature contributed by western authors in specific and 
recent studies in general on various key issues of inorganic choices such as joint ventures, 
alliances, networks, mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, LBOs, management buyouts, 
partnerships, and so forth (e.g., Ariño and Ring, 2010; Capron and Guillén, 2009; Elango and 
Pattnaik, 2011; Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Pe’er and Gottschalg, 2011; Slangen, 2011; Villalonga 
and Mcgahan, 2005). We further comprehend the previous studies on definite strategies such 
as diversification, turnaround, and foreign market entry modes (e.g., Bruton et al., 2003; 
Chakrabarti et al., 2007; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Matusik and Fitza, 2012; Oh and 
Contractor, 2012; Reddy, 2015b, 2015c). More specifically, we recognize various linked 
perceptions on buyouts and entrepreneurship (e.g., Ragozzino and Reuer, 2010), emerging 
economies and inorganic-tactics (e.g., Brannen and Voisey, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012), and 
other allied contributions in the mergers and buyouts research. Thereafter, we have described 
reviews systematically and then, borrowed their concrete guidelines for building a strong 
foundation to a theory proposed in the following section of this paper. In fact, hypotheses 
formulated, rigorous methodology employed, and findings discovered by prominent authors 
in western world (e.g., U.S., and UK outcomes) assisted us to narrow-down the framework 
developed in specific perceptions, propositions, and limitations. 
Consistent with the future research agenda suggested by Wright, Chiplin, Thompson, 
and Robbie (1990), Zahra (1993), Chaganti and Schneer (1994), Phan, Wright, Ucbasaran, 
and Tan (2009), Ramamurti (2012), and Siegel et al. (2011), we incorporate their 
recommendations in the suggested CoBO theory for continuity and development in the 
existing literature. Eventually, CoBO model would flourish M&A and buyout literature to 
benefiting both the third-world countries, and emerging nations. In the next section, we 
present foundations and characteristics of the proposed framework. 
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CONTRACTUAL BUYOUT (CoBO) 
Foundation setting 
The valuable contributions made by Bowman et al. (1999), Bull (1989), Fox and 
Marcus (1992), Guo et al. (2011), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Loh (1992), Opler (1992), 
Reddy (2015a, 2015d), Roden and Lewellen (1995), Shivdasani and Wang (2011), Wright 
and Buck (1992), Wright et al. (1994), Wright et al. (2000), and Wright et al. (2003) helped 
as deep-seated pedestal to supply this well-structured theoretical framework for protecting the 
government, and sick companies on the initiative stones laid in the U.S., for example, RJR 
leveraged buyout by KKR & Co (e.g., Dalton, 1989; Landsman et al., 2002), smaller 
company LBOs (Malone, 1989), role of buyouts in restructuring Central and Eastern Europe 
(Wright et al., 1993), partial mergers in Japan (Park and Russo, 1996; Ushijima, 2010), 
partial acquisitions by Japanese firms in the U.S. (Chen and Hennart, 2004), LBO 
transactions in the Russian Federation (Kasparova, 2007), and industrial diversification and 
partial privatization (Lin and Su, 2008). Recently, Amess and Wright (2012) analyze the 
employment effects of PE-backed and non-PE-backed LBOs. As part of the foundation to the 
model, financing CoBO transaction is a larger task, however, we recommend few studies to 
solve this issue for benefiting the finance and economics scholars.
11
  More specifically, we 
consider recent studies on various issues examined in emerging economies (e.g., de la Torre 
and Chacar, 2012; Meyer et al., 2009; Peng, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012), choice among growth 
strategies (e.g., Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Kock and Guillen, 2001; Lockett, Wiklund, 
                                                          
11
 The studies purposively suggested here are ranging from contracting to financing buyouts. Generally, buyouts 
funded by the investment bankers as a debt. Conventionally, more than 90 per cent of LBO deals purchase price 
of an acquisition financed by debt, and the tangible assets of target firm that have been used as collateral for 
loan amount (Kasparova, 2007; Ray, 2010). Finance researchers may refer for the extensive review on financing 
LBOs in Russian Federation (Kasparova, 2007), other contributions include Axelson, Strömberg, and Weisbach, 
2009; Braun and Latham, 2007; Chaganti and Schneer, 1994; Chen and Hennart, 2004; Cumming et al., 2007; 
Fishman, 1989; Phan et al., 2009; Prasch , 1992; Schlingemann, 2004; Siegel et al., 2011; Wier et al., 2005; 
Wright, Robbie, and Thompson, 1989; Wright et al., 2003. Selectively, we recommend the recent studies on 
methods of payments in asset sales (Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek, 2005), and the role of collateralized debt 
obligations in LBOs boom (Shivdasani and Wang, 2011). Scholars may also study the well-examined paper on 
reverse leveraged buyouts (Braun and Latham, 2009).    
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Davidsson, and Girma, 2011; Slangen, 2011), and corporate entrepreneurship (e.g., Madhok 
and Keyhani, 2012; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2010).  
The Theory of the Growth of the Firm by Edith Penrose, first published in 1959, is a 
seminal contribution to the field of management (Penrose, 1959). This theory postulates that 
a firm’s current growth rate would be inclined by the adjustment costs of, and changes to a 
firm’s productive opportunity set arising from, previous growth. Penrose made it 
understandable that organic growth and acquisitive growth are two different strategic choices 
(cf. Lockett et al., 2011). For example, when two firms communicate to transfer rights for 
operating a business, the option between an acquisition and an alliance for one of the firms 
amounts to a choice between a divestiture and an alliance (Villalonga and Mcgahan, 2005: 
1183).
12
 In fact, a larger firm can acquire the assets of the smaller unit; or the larger firm can 
sell its assets through a divestiture to the smaller unit. It all happens because of one 
fundamental reason that two firm’s combine their resources to enhance superior value by 
experiencing possible synergy between them (Wang and Zajac, 2007: 1294).  
Lockett et al. (2011) extend Penrose’s work for examining the impact of organic and 
acquisitive growth on current organic growth of Swedish firms; results state that previous 
acquisitive growth has a positive effect on current organic growth. More importantly, 
Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) describe joint venture as a tool for diminishing the transaction 
expenses deserved when acquiring other firms. Similarly, Hennart and Reddy (1997) 
investigate the determinants of the choice between merger /acquisition and the greenfield 
equity joint venture on 175 Japanese investments in the U.S. during 1978-89. Results show 
that equity joint ventures are preferred over acquisitions when the desired assets connected to 
                                                          
12
 Villalonga and Mcgahan (2005) investigate how firms choose among acquisitions, alliances, and divestitures 
on 9,276 deals completed by 86 members of the Fortune 100 between 1990 and 2000. Based on resources, they 
state that transaction costs, internalization, organizational learning, social embeddedness, asymmetric 
information, and real options theories are highly related, and complementary. 
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non-desired assets.
13
 In collaboration settings, efficiency and effectiveness in the interaction 
among actors increase by way of actor capabilities and values, commons, protocols, 
processes, and infrastructures (Fjeldstad et al., 2012).
14
 In fact, partner specific knowledge 
between a pair of firms influence the likelihood of firms forming an alliance vs. acquisition 
(Wang and Zajac, 2007). 
15
 On the other hand, with the higher levels of ownership incentives 
senior executives often motivated to acquire risk-enhancing enterprises (Wright et al., 2002). 
A query raised by Chen and Hennart (2004), state that partial acquisitions create a hostage 
effect that compose likely ex ante selection of targets and ex post enforcement of deals
 
.
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Conceptually, A partial acquisition represents a unique form of corporate restructuring 
because it alters the ownership structure of two entities (in opposite ways). These acquisitions 
represent a shift in control, and allow unique opportunity to measure how the effects on 
performance levels of the partial targets are conditioned (Akhigbe et al., 2004).
17
 Partial 
merging firms usually large, and more diversified whilst partner firms tend to have more 
heterogeneous industry backgrounds (Ushijima, 2010). For example, partial acquisitions yield 
positive, and considerable abnormal returns to large and small firm shareholders in the 
Japanese institutional setup especially manufacturing sector (Park and Russo, 1996). 
In the last few decades, the choice of entry strategy into global markets has received a 
lot of interest from both the developed and emerging business researchers. Many studies have 
surveyed factors that influence the option for different entry modes, often examined diverse 
alternatives such as licensing, joint ventures, and wholly owned subsidiaries (cf. Harzing, 
2002). Anand and Delios (2002) analyze choices of global entry on 2,175 entries by UK, 
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 The results also show that the greater the Japanese’s investor experience of the U.S. market the more likely 
they will choose acquisitions over joint venture (p. 11). 
14
 However, multiparty collaboration is critical to the effective solution of complex problems and continuous 
adaptation to changing environments. 
15
 Combined alliance capabilities increase an alliance formation, and an acquisition between two firms. 
16
 Acquisition is partial, if Japanese parent buy less than 80 per cent of equity stake in the US target firms (Chen 
and Hennart, 2004: 1133). 
17
 Akhigbe et al. (2004) examine 330 partial acquisitions from 1980 to 1998. The long-term performance effects 
are more favorable when the partial target has more growth opportunities, a lower degree of financial leverage, 
and when the partial acquirer is related and closer in size to the partial target. 
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German, and Japanese investors in the U.S. during 1974-91. In case of downstream 
capabilities, which tend not to be geographically fungible, the absolute level of capabilities in 
the entered industry explains the mode of choice; however, it shown contrast results for 
upstream capabilities. In a weaker institutional framework, joint ventures used to access 
many resources, but in a stronger institutional framework, joint ventures become less 
significant while acquisitions can play a key role in accessing resources that are intangible, 
and organizationally embedded (Meyer et al., 2009).
18
 Specifically, Ariño and Ring (2010) 
demonstrates that fairness considerations would play an essential task in international joint 
ventures.
19
 Allatta and Singh (2011) examine changes in worker communication networks 
between the acquiring and target firms’ employees during post-acquisition integration, found 
that target firm workers’ positions within their contacts are sluggish to change.  
The increased market integration may lead firms to ascertain closer managerial 
coordination among subsidiaries to an extent proportional to the strength of external changes 
(cf. de la Torre and Chacar, 2012). For example, designing a governance contract to align 
interests of managers, and shareholders rather than simply developing governance structures 
that reduce the costs of effecting a transaction would seem to be important (Filatotchev and 
Wright, 2011). More interestingly, emerging economies have opened their markets, resulting 
in increasing competition from foreign firms. To cope with the influx of new competition, 
emerging country multinational enterprises (EMNEs) employ serial acquisitions to build 
capabilities (Elango and Pattnaik, 2011).
20
 In a related study, Slangen (2011) examine 231 
entries by Dutch MNEs into 48 countries during 1996-2003, evidence that geographic and 
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 Analyze the entry strategies of foreign investors entering emerging economies include India, Vietnam, South 
Africa, and Egypt for knowing the impact of market-supporting institutions on business strategies. 
19
 Fairness can be a key element to the success of such formation processes by shaping the logics partners apply 
in evaluating the efficiency of a potential alliance, and in making a final decision whether or not to form an 
alliance under negotiation, and other variants of fairness can be found at play. 
20
 They examine 175 acquisitions made by Indian firms during 2000–2006, found that firms acquire targets 
serially but of increasing value in a sequential manner to learn, and build capabilities thus resulting in reducing 
risk as well as optimizing their ability to learn from the acquisitions. 
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linguistic barriers to verbal communication play important roles in MNEs’ establishment 
decisions.
21
 Therefore, developed country MNEs (DMNEs) have had gear up to exploit new 
opportunities and resources in emerging markets, and EMNEs have had to figure out how to 
take advantage of them in the rest of the world (Ramamurti, 2012).  
Most prior research in the field of global strategy focuses on what choices executives 
make to build the competitive advantage of a firm, from setting up activities in different 
locations to coordinating the linkages between them (cf. Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2011). 
Brannen and Voisey (2012), and Nachum (2012) seek understanding of the role of 
comparative learning in global strategy formulation. Nachum describe that comparative 
approach is particularly appealing in relation to international strategy, and comparisons are at 
the sympathy of business strategy. The international business environment by the increase in 
the number of organizations acting across borders has been affected by the actions of 
EMNEs, NGOs, and governments (Westney, 2011). In recent days, the global strategy of 
multinational enterprises from China also started to establish geographic advantage (Peng, 
2012).
22
 Oh and Contractor (2012) illustrate that territorial scope covered by the firm makes a 
substantial difference to the relationship between multinationality, and performance. 
Therefore, global firms need to distinguish the crucial role of foreign subsidiary strategy in 
building global competitive advantage, and emphasizing corporate control (Pehrsson, 2012). 
Pehrsson found that greater business relatedness and business scope of the subsidiary weaken 
the negative impact of competition barriers on subsidiary performance. For example, 
privatization law in Poland allows for a procedure of liquidation, buyout occurs when 
incumbent management and employees create a private enterprise to lease state assets. 
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 Slangen develops a communication-based theory of the choice by MNEs between greenfield and acquisition 
entry; argues that MNE parents communicate with their subsidiaries for reasons of knowledge exchange, 
coordination, monitoring, and socialization. 
22
 They propose three relatively unique aspects: (1) the previously underappreciated role played by the home 
country governments of MNEs as an institutional force, (2) the challenge of going abroad in the absence of 
significantly superior technological and managerial resources, and (3) the rapid adoption of acquisitions as a 
primary mode of entry. 
20 
 
Similar models observed in Russia, and other emerging economies like Mexico, Hungary, 
Romania, Slovenia and other nations in CEE region (Wright et al., 1993). Specifically in 
China, buyouts reflect conflicts among the government’s desire to retain political control, 
whereas private investor’s desire for return on their investments (Su, 2005). Cain, Denis, and 
Denis (2011) examine 990 acquisitions during 1994-2003, document specific contractual 
terms of acquisition agreements contain earnouts.
23
 Consistent with this background, we 
introduce CoBO theoretical framework, which includes definition, parties represent in the 
model, guidelines, and merits.  
What is CoBO? 
CoBO is an extension, and shall be next wave to the LBOs, which would be a part of 
the inorganic growth strategy. Further, it appears similar to a Futures Contract in the 
derivatives market. The buyout agreement shall be happen before the true mix of balance 
sheets of both the companies, i.e. acquirer and target firm. When the agreement takes place, 
the acquirer firm will create a subsidiary unit for joint management whilst operations 
controlling by the target firm corporate board. It means that the acquirer share their expertise, 
technology, work force, and operational activities with target firm for strengthening financial 
position, employee sustainability, and corporate responsibility in the industry. In addition to 
this, it protect the public interest through virtual acquisition of the target firm by investing 
nominal, or required amount with the financial courtesy of an investment banker, or financier 
in the form of debt. Specifically, the acquirer firm provides an acknowledgement of 
guarantee to the amount of debt funded by the lender.  
We define the proposed CoBO as follows. Three or more parties agree to form a 
combined entity, or live like a single entity after the immediate collapse of CoBO 
deed/agreement when settling the agreed financial arrangements among the involved parties, 
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 Earnouts represent payments to shareholders in M&A deals and contain two components: an upfront fixed 
payment and additional future payments that are contingent upon some apparent appraisal of performance. 
These later payments are called earnouts (p. 152). 
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which usually occur in the premises of court, is called a contractual buyout. Mandatory 
parties include Acquirer, Target firm, and Financier/Lender.
24
 Briefly, it is a takeover 
defensive tactic, choice of foreign market entry option, and opportune to get tax advantage. 
From the government perspective, it ensures monitoring, and administering the public sector 
units to protect public and society interest whilst controlling the monopoly character in the 
business. Largely, it secures, and sustains more number of sick units to promising sustainable 
life for the citizens of a country. CoBO would be efficient inorganic magnetic for VCs and 
PEs as a part of foreign market entry strategy. More specifically, CoBO would be the best-fit 
model for cross-border M&A integration strategy.  
Elements of the agreement 
1) CoBO should have three parties – acquirer, target firm and financier. 
2) Acquirer business value shall be equal, or more than five times of the target firm 
business value (not necessarily in all situations), hence, financier recommendation 
plays a key role. 
3) It is not necessary that the parties should be in the same business line. It can be 
conglomerate, or diversified. Reasons for merging the target firm balance sheet with 
acquirer balance sheet should be on the following primary/border line of the proposed 
CoBO model. The reasons include disinvestment, turnaround strategy of sick 
industries, corporate restructuring, expansion strategy, entry of new markets, 
diversification as a choice, and party's interest in the context of law. 
4) Parties should satisfy leverage norms, guidelines, and requirements while permitting 
debt service by the select investment banker 
5) The following conditions should be satisfied while CoBO deed turns-on 
i) No party should void the contract 
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 The financier or lender can be venture capitalist, private equity, or investment banker. 
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ii) Contract period can be three, or five years 
iii) If an acquirer wants to break up, or not to continue the corporate life with target 
firm, primarily the acquirer has to repay the commission received earlier, and 
clears the remaining amount of debt.  
iv) If target firm wants to break up their deed with the acquirer before completion 
date, simply it has to merge with acquirer, and then acquirer has to bear the 
remaining debt amount along with interest.  
v) During the agreement time, acquirer may buy any other assets, business units, or 
equity stake in the market. Alternatively, it can sell their own-stake to some other 
party, but the other party should consider CoBO deed as a contingent liability. 
vi) During the contract, target firm have no right to sell their equity, asset stake, or 
control to someone, or entering any agreement without board approval of the 
acquirer firm.  
vii) Further, no company/person have right to buy the target company (even in open 
market) during the CoBO deed.  
6) Acquirer gets a certain percent of commission on future sales of the target firm, which 
can be, from the half of the contract time (For example, from third year on-ward in a 
five years contract).  
7) Whereas, target firm is essential to pay the interest amount from third year onwards 
until the completion of CoBO deed, or clearance of debt, whichever is earlier. From 
fifth year onwards, target firm has to pay both interest, and principal amount, if the 
deed has written for seven years. If any principal amount is left in the deed, that 
amount must be partially paid by an acquirer through its subsidiary company. 
8) If target firm do not want to continue like a single entity after the collapsation of an 
agreement, it has to merge with acquirer (desire to continue), therefore, no option for 
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the target firm. Further, two balance sheets merge after paying the debt obligations of 
the target firm by acquirer’s subsidiary firm.  
9) If target firm wants to continue like a single entity, first the CoBO deed must be wind-
up along with financial arrangements, which was funded by the investment bankers. 
10) Finally, obtaining No Objection Certificate from all the parties with seal in the 
premises of court, later target firm may continue like single entity. In the first year of 
deed completion, target firm has no right to merge, acquire, or takeover with, or by 
any other company.  
Contractual Buyout (CoBO) model: 
The proposed contractual buyout model has depicted in Fig. 1. This model explains 
the involvement of parties, actions that could be taking place between the parties, and then 
how the merger occurs from the CoBO model. Further, it explains various issues related to 
participation in the CoBO model. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The model, or theory portrayed in Fig. 2 describes three phases namely CoBO period, 
simple merger, and single entity, defining as main streams of contractual buyout. The 
following illustration explains CoBO framework, then how it could be executed whilst 
convincing the existing literature. 
Illustration:  
Fig. 2 shows CoBO model, and describes how it can turnaround a sick unit into 
economic-value based entity. Assume that two parties involved in CoBO model, acquirer and 
target firm. To enumerate, we have taken time line on x-axis and growth line on y-axis in the 
given pictorial diagram. Various studies describe that firm can grow on two streams, which 
states organic growth line (OGL), and inorganic growth line (IOGL). Logically, a firm 
becomes cash-rich entity by choosing inorganic choices (e.g., joint ventures, mergers, 
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amalgamations, acquisitions, buyouts), and elected fast whilst higher growth rate compare to 
the conventional organic growth strategies (e.g., new product development, new market). 
Predict that a target firm profit had fallen at 6th year, point A and then continuing the 
losses, thus the reasons could be plummeted sales, low technology, hyperactive competition, 
and higher product cost in contrary to the availability of low cost product in the market. At 
9th year and point B, target firm has entered CoBO agreement with an identified acquirer for 
the period of five years. As a result, target firm would come out from the losses (recovery 
trend) by the end of 4th year of contract period in 13th year at point C. Further, it would have 
more chances to get into profits line. Hence, contract period shall complete at point D in the 
14th year. After CoBO period collapses, target firm has right to continue its previous phase 
like single entity, or simply, it can merge with acquirer. Lastly, acquirer would be getting an 
opportunity to achieve socio, cultural, economic, and operational integration without 
technical errors. More importantly, post-merger integration can be administered without any 
complexity by choosing CoBO model for inorganic growth. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
PROPOSITIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
In addition to the foundation of model, we conceptualize CoBO propositions on the 
basis of seminal work documented such as, internal operating changes (Malone, 1989; in 
buy-ins, Robbie, Wright, and Thompson, 1992), diminution of political costs (Bull, 1989), 
information irregularity (Howorth, Westhead, and Wright, 2004), employee participation 
(Chaplinsky, Niehaus, and Van de Gucht, 1998), improving marketing system and financial 
competence (Niederfolker, 1991; Shivdasani and Wang, 2011), capital for administration 
(Cumming, 2005), venture capitalists investment support (Wright and Lockett, 2003), cross-
border PE financing (Mevleman and Wright, 2011), deductions in income tax (Bull, 1989), 
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tax savings for LBOs (Fox and Marcus, 1992; Opler and Titman, 1991; Roden and Lewellen, 
1995), new business through market progress (Zahra, 1993), equity in established firms 
(Parker and van Praag, 2012), global market entry choice through partial acquisitions (Chen 
and Hennart, 2004), government venture capital funds (Cumming, 2007), and raising the need 
of monitoring PE and LBO acquisition process (Siegel et al., 2011).  
To the best of our knowledge, no academic validation has recognized a merger, or 
buyout framework that protects government, and loss making industries. In this regard, strong 
evidence that government controlled diversified firms has lower Tobin’s q 25  than non-
governmental controlled firms, whereas valuation effect depends upon government control 
(Lin and Su, 2008). Disinvestment used as a defense against takeovers (Lambrecht and 
Myers, 2007), further buyout concept can apply to acquire the falling firms. In addition to the 
above tactics, buyouts applicable to institutions where considerable amount of investment has 
been required (Wright et al., 1993). For example, buyouts providing a means for Japanese 
corporations to reorganize in order to face up confront of difficult economic conditions, and 
increasing competitive pressures (Wright et al., 2003). Their implications include 
management of large corporations, managers of subsidiaries, government policy, and foreign 
investors. We consider that CoBO framework would be well fit for the emerging market 
economies, and other third world nations at greater macroeconomic benefit. Further, we 
robustly support the work, and hypotheses developed in earlier research that suits our model, 
and accommodating those guidelines for policy implications as follows. Fig. 3 presents both 
the foundations, and propositions explored in this study. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Information symmetry and administrative changes 
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 Tobin’s q is the ratio of market value to current replacement value of a firm’s non-financial assets (Weston et 
al., 1998). Finance scholars may see for illustrative examples in Damodaran (2002). 
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In the course of post-buyout internal operating changes, anticipate that the locus of 
verdict making would shift towards the pilot investor, and managerial compensation become 
incentive based (Malone, 1989). This would be possible impact factor on leadership, and 
middle level managers of acquirer firm. In the context of political and associated risks, we 
support the views of Bull (1989), while fragmenting CoBO deal domestically, or 
internationally as a market entry tactic.
26
 However, information asymmetries were common 
in nature, transparency while negotiating deal consideration, and deal framework, though the 
level of information irregularity influences it (Howorth et al., 2004: 510; Shivdasani and 
Wang, 2011). We explore propositions in light of compensation, and political costs.  
Proposition (1): Acquirer managerial skill influences the target firm middle managers, 
and significant rise in compensation.  
Proposition (2a): CoBO deal success, or failure do not influences by political risks, 
and rebuff to associate political costs.  
Proposition (2b): Exchange of transparent information between acquirer, target firm 
and financier while negotiating CoBO deal.  
Another study in buy-ins by Robbie et al. (1992) describe administrative changes 
materialize to be momentous, extensive changes in buyouts considerably greater compared to 
buy-ins. It reproduces an asymmetric information dilemma that is higher in buy-ins than buy-
outs. On the other hand, Thronhill and Amit (2000) identify two proportions of the fit 
between parent houses and their venture firms: relational and economic. A relational fit 
replicates organizational culture and structure, and economic fit is a function of the needs of 
the venture and the resources of the parent. Hence, success connects with awareness, 
commitment and association, and appears to have a greater relationship with venture success 
than does the economic dimension (Thronhill and Amit, 2000). In the context of management 
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 Political costs are expected to be reduced for one segment of LBOs, i.e. publicly held corporations that go 
private. However, they do not deserve out-of-pocket costs related to serving outstanding shareholders, meeting 
regulatory reporting requirements, and maintaining relationships with analysts (Bull, 1989: 265). 
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buy-ins,
27
 Robbie et al. (1992) notice better monitoring in buy-ins compare to buyouts. 
However, CoBO imparts acquirer administrative supremacy on target-firm business activities 
further monitors market and industry adjustments in the business environment. The following 
proposition presents concerning the post-CoBO administrative changes.  
Proposition (3): Optimistic administrative changes, and superior monitoring in the 
target-firm operations during CoBO deed, and post-CoBO period compare to prior the deal.  
Interestingly, Zahra (1995) documents changes in entrepreneurial actions, evaluation 
and connection between entrepreneurial activities, and performance. His hypothesis, 
company’s commitment to corporate entrepreneurship activities increases after LBO is an 
additional recommendation for CoBO model. We suggest acquirers, and financiers consider 
the above issue while designing post-contractual integration strategies. We introduce 
proposition in view of entrepreneurial activities.  
Proposition (4): CoBO models improve entrepreneur’s self-confidence, and capability 
of target firm entrepreneurial activities. 
Employment and employee role 
Employee participation plays an extreme role while restructuring labor contracts, 
resulting changes make easy financing of buyout, and the ownership structure that emerges in 
employee buyouts usually features a large degree of managerial control (Chaplinsky et al., 
1998). In particular, Robbie, Wright, and Ennew (1993) examine 64 receivership buyouts 
during 1990-92, potentially viable divisions, or sub-divisions of failed groups has made 
buyout attempts prior to collapse, and that managers often had an alternative employment 
opportunities after buyout. Typically, buyouts tend to employ fewer jobs compare to other 
firms in the similar industry (Kaplan, 1989). The following proposition is configured 
regarding employment and employee role.  
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 Management buy-in (MBI) is buying a firm through external entrepreneurs, where as management buyout is 
the purchase of the firm by a group of normally four to six senior managers who are already employed in the 
business typically using their own funds plus external private equity, and bank loans (Howorth et al., 2004). 
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Proposition (5a): CoBO arrangements do not affect on target firm employment, and 
then, there would be minor managerial changes at middle level.  
Proposition (5b): Defining and recognition of target firm employee responsibility and 
his (her) role in decision-making leads to accumulate firm performance during CoBO deed.   
Operating performance and financial arrangement 
Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) is important for a company’s survival, profitability, 
and growth (Zahra, Filatotchev, and Wright, 2009). More specifically, Simsek and Heavey 
(2011) indicate that CE is positively associated with knowledge-based capital, and through 
this, with performance. Niederfolker (1991: 239) describes that a mixture of small firms’ 
expertise with larger firms marketing system, and financial competence promises margins. 
His core hypothesis also proposed to advocate CoBO policy.
28
 By contrast, Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2006: 570) suggest that LSVCCs
29
 are mediocre organizational forms, which 
reveal higher agency costs, and lesser returns. The generous tax subsidies underlying the 
LSVCC programs lower the required rate of return, allowing out-bid other types of funds, 
drive up deal prices, and lower returns in the market. This could have been occurred due to 
well-developed markets, and we strongly acclaim that lesser agency costs, and mediate 
returns can be observed in emerging nations, moreover our model incurs only initial costs 
when deed takes place (Shivdasani and Wang, 2011). Zahra (1995) observe amendments in 
different activities during post-LBO period, were optimistically associated with changes in 
firm performance. Further, we incorporate his hypothesis
30
 to validate the proposed model for 
industry effectiveness whilst augmenting the professionalism of CE. Cumming et al. (2007) 
notice that buyout performance has been consistent with superior risk adjusted performance 
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 Why did your company get involved in this relationship and has the cooperation been developing overtime? 
29
 Canadian governmental subsidization of venture capital firm, Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporation 
(LSVCC). 
30
 H2a: company’s performance will be higher after an LBO than before the transaction, and  
H3: Changes in post-LBO corporate entrepreneurship (venturing and innovation) are positively associated with 
company financial performance. 
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relative to industry yardstick. We intend propositions on financial performance during 
negotiations, and post-CoBO period.  
Proposition (6a): Target firm operating performance recovers from the loss zone to 
revitalization zone during CoBO deed/agreement.  
Proposition (6b): Consistent operating, and financial prowess notices in the target 
firm post-CoBO period, if it continues as a single entity.  
An interesting study conducted on government initiated venture activity in Australia 
by Cumming (2007) describes that IIF program provides valuable governance mechanisms to 
facilitate entrepreneurial finance.
31
 Similar mechanisms observed in the U.S., and advanced 
to those commenced in Canada, and UK. We define a proposition on target firms controlled 
by government.  
Proposition (7): CoBO policy improves operating performance of government-owned 
undertakings in the post-buyout period.  
In the context of cross-country private equity syndication, Mevleman and Wright 
(2011) examine the role of institutional context,
32
 and organizational learning
33
 as 
determinants of cross-border PE syndication. Their results report that institutional context and 
organizational learning have considerably related to the use of cross-border syndicates. We 
also recommend their hypothesis to originate propositions, and hypotheses for policy 
formulation concerning contractual buyout. Hypotheses include why foreign PE firms rely on 
local partners through cross-border syndicates when investing abroad. We robustly support 
the hypothesis developed, tested and validated by Mevleman and Wright (2011) that PE firms 
reduce institutional environment barriers through learning. The following proposition 
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 IIF – Innovation Investment Fund of Australian government program was introduced in 1997. 
32
 Institutional context – number of PE firms in the local environment and presence of investment bankers in the 
local market. 
33
 Organizational learning – PE firms experience in the host country, multinational experience, and the number 
of investment managers per portfolio entity. 
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depends on the tax subsidization, tax holidays, or any other seminal benefits promised by the 
respective country.  
Proposition (8a): CoBO attracts international VCs and PE firms to invest in loss 
making units, and government sick industrial clusters.  
Proposition (8b): PE firms and VCs increase private and social value by 
accommodating the debt for sick/loss-making units through CoBO policy. 
Tax savings  
Another motivating avenue, tax savings provide a strong incentive for LBOs. First, by 
issuing additional debt, firms increase interest deductions. Second, they obtain depreciation 
benefits. Third, both the principal, and the interest on loans incurred by employee stock 
ownership plans (ESOPs, if any) are tax deductable (Fox and Marcus, 1992). Vigorously, we 
also recommend the contributions made by Fox and Marcus, and their subjective propositions 
greatly suits to explore CoBO propositions. We strongly recommend their proposition 3 - the 
occurrence of LBOs is positively related to the expected future tax savings (p. 171). The 
above proposition is suggested to test the hypothesis in CoBO model by considering various 
observed variables. Further, we also carry forward their proposition 6 - after the buyout 
unrelated diversification declines, and proposition 7 - after the buyout, overhead expenses 
and corporate staff size declines. Similarly, we support the intent developed by Amess and 
Wright (2012) that smaller LBO deals has motivated to grow their businesses, and swell jobs. 
We suggest CoBO propositions on acquirer tax savings in light of target firm buyout.  
Proposition (9a): Acquirer’s free cash flows augment during CoBO deed in the form 
of commission, or consultancy fees. 
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Proposition (9b): Acquirer’s free cash flows mount-up after the collapse of CoBO 
agreement in the form of tax subsidization.
34
  
Likewise, Landsman et al. (2002) conduct a test at the individual taxpayer level of 
associations between compliance rates for capital gains taxes accumulated by RJR Nabisco 
shareholders during its leveraged buyout. They find non-compliances declining in taxable 
income, and other interest paid, further it produced more capital gains. Conversely, improved 
operating results are a cutback in income tax (Bull, 1989). Post-LBO tax savings as a key 
resource value, because of the heavy debt involved, and the more interest payment required, 
thus LBOs produce tax shields that can be a major venture for cash flows (Lowenstein, 1985 
in [Zahra, 1995]; Opler and Titman, 1991; Roden and Lewellen, 1995). Typically, VCs invest 
with a view to exit, as entrepreneurial firms do not have cash flows to compensate interest on 
debt, and dividends on equity, therefore, VCs customarily invest towards an exit, and ensure 
capital gains (Cumming, 2007).  
Proposition (10): CoBO deals do not encroach on acquirer, or target firm retail 
shareholders tax savings. 
Choice of market entry strategy 
We advise multinational VCs, PE players, and investment bankers choose CoBO as a 
foreign market entry choice in view of international marketing, and cooperative strategies’ to 
avoid biased causes, agency costs (Shivdasani and Wang, 2011), and political risks (Bull, 
1989), whilst availing tax benefits by entering contractual deal with loss making units in the 
host country. Hence, established firms are less risky than brand new firms are. However, new 
ventures have superior growth and margins, and less survival rates compare to established 
firms. Further, problems of asymmetric information are more acute in new ventures compare 
to established firms (Parker and van Praag, 2012). In particular, internationalization exposes 
                                                          
34
 Assume that government allowing acquirers to avail tax benefits after completion of contractual buyout deed. 
Therefore, acquirer would be getting tax benefits in light of CoBO deed. 
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the firm to a multi-set of prospects, which would permit it to control the possible latent in, 
and curtail from various asymmetries (Madhok and Keyhani, 2012).
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Proposition (11a): CoBO could be a choice of international market entry strategy for 
acquires at initial stage by investing in established firms (loss, or slow growth firms).  
Proposition (11b): CoBO would be superior choice of global market entry strategy for 
VCs and PE firms in the host country. 
After buyout, subsidization of weak units’ discontinued and excess cash can be used 
to create new business, there by promoting entrepreneurship (Jensen, 1989 in [Zahra, 1995]) 
to promise new life to the loss-making units for economic and industrial integration benefits. 
Zahra (1993) describes that innovation, and venturing activities stress creating new business 
through market developments or by undertaking product, process, technological and 
administrative innovations; one of the venturing goal is to improve productivity and margins. 
We suggest that these types of venturing are the most welcome in developing nations through 
cross-country contractual buyouts as a global entry choice. Further, we support the hypothesis 
developed by Chaganti and Schneer (1994: 245) that performance, and management patterns 
vary across mode of entry thus does the effectiveness of strategic management patterns. In 
particular, partial acquisitions help MNEs to protect against sellers ex post opportunism. 
Therefore, MNEs can form joint ventures with domestic firms by sharing capital, and 
management of new entities with them, or buying partial equity of established local firms for 
them (Chen and Hennart, 2004).  
Proposition (12): CoBO could be superior inorganic strategy for acquirer’s at lesser 
acquisition cost as a choice of market entry and product diversification. In addition, it lifts 
acquirer’s free cash-flows compared to conventional organic-growth strategies. 
Integration strategy and implementation  
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institutional deficits, where regulatory structures are more fickle and less sophisticated. 
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A firm no longer desire to prolong ownership of a set of actions but wish to continue a 
market presence. Such a change involves vertical or horizontal de-integration of interests, 
with retention of one, or more stages in the firms’ production process (Wright et al., 1990: 
57). Earlier research on M&A proven that cultural diversity influence socio-culture 
amalgamation, synergy insight, and shareholder value (Stahl and Voight, 2008) while 
achieving post-integration planning and administration goals. More importantly, post-
acquisition process is rarely smooth because in acquiring a new bundle of assets and 
capabilities, the company also inherits the way in which the target is embedded in its 
institutional environment (Capron and Guillén, 2009). Hence, the proposed model helps 
acquirers to gain on-screen experience (Dating-before-Merging) with target firm during 
CoBO deed. After CoBO deed collapses, if target firm wants to sell their ownership it would 
be trouble-free task for an acquirer to craft post-acquisition trade operations. Therefore, we 
explore a proposition in light of post-merger integration as a subjective issue.  
Proposition (13): CoBO is an advanced strategy to achieve cross-cultural aspects in 
domestic M&A integration. Therefore, it is a better inorganic choice to attain socio, and 
cross-cultural factors, which are similar to cross-border M&A integration problems. 
Government and policy makers 
In the milieu of political economy, a well-designed policy can change the idiom of the 
economy that creates country prosperous in-terms of employment, growth, and sustainable 
economic development. For practitioners and public policy makers, we highlight the need of 
developing, and enforcing an appropriate regulatory framework that strengthens the 
principles of fixture under which entrepreneurs drive a paradigm of market for corporate 
control whilst considering the proposed CoBO model.  For example, in the former USSR, the 
establishment of economic reforms radically changed the commerce and trade activities 
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(Filatotchev, Wright, Buck, and Zhukov, 1999).
36
 In particular, post-LBO changes in agency, 
and governance dealings are another important source of assessment (Zahra, 1995). 
Interestingly, direct government created venture capital funds in Australia through IIF policy 
facilitates governing mechanism for entrepreneurial finance (Cumming, 2007). Moreover, the 
existence, and development of smaller firms are essential for robust economic growth and 
employment. In the U.S., these firms employ a large amount of people and small businesses 
are significant innovators in the American economy (Maier and Walker, 1987).  
Recently, Siegel et al. (2011) describe that insider information in PE, and LBO 
transactions suggest a need of adopting regulatory efforts to investigate the acquisition 
process more closely. Undertaking Maier and Walker (1987) views, we recommend emerging 
nation’s governments to enact CoBO policy for protecting government control on public 
sector units, and ensure the promising economic assistance for loss-making industries whilst 
controlling the monopoly monarch in the competitive business environment. We describe 
propositions in reference to policymaking, and ratification.  
Proposition (14): Robust growth would be observed in small industries, amplification 
in revenue, and technology transfer due to enactment of CoBO policy.  
Proposition (15): Fall in domestic M&A deals and controlling monopoly character in 
the trade and commerce due to practice of CoBO policy. Furthermore, it improves 
information equilibrium, and transparency between government and industry associations.  
In addition to the above policy implications and propositions, further we define CoBO 
is best-fit tactic, and could be a choice of takeover defensive strategy. In detail, no company, 
individual, or group of employees (e.g., management buyout) have right to acquire, takeover, 
or open market purchase of target firm during CoBO deed/agreement period. If outsider 
convenience acquirer to buy ownership of target firm, thus those types of third party 
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arrangements are void in the court of law. Conversely, it could void CoBO deed, and 
principles of the model. More importantly, target firm do not have any right to declare 
management, and administrative changes without consulting acquirer’s board. Accordingly, 
they must follow CoBO guidelines, and explanations. We explore a proposition in light of 
defensive tactic.  
Proposition (16): CoBO would be protective strategy against hostile takeovers, and 
acquisition of outstanding shares in the open market.       
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Surging M&A and PE deals in emerging market economies influence the regulators 
that they would be required to continue their public-administrative control in key areas such 
as public systems, public administration, and focused industries for benefiting the society. 
This article has presented an original exploration on the academic research grounds ranging 
from market for corporate control to diversification and partial privatization. We suggest 
CoBO propositions through considering the distinguished research work contributed in areas 
such as connection between entrepreneurial activities and firm performance, operating 
efficiency in the post-LBO period, tax savings, foreign market entry choice through partial 
acquisition, and the recent studies on international PE syndication, and call for investigating 
PE and LBO acquisition process.  In particular, we employ the strategies of various buyout 
models developed in western markets as a pedestal, further initiate to develop new theoretical 
simulation that is likely to be adopted in emerging and third world nations because of the 
character of these nation’s entrepreneurs, and changing institutional setting in the competitive 
business environment. More specifically, the motive behind CoBO deal is equivalent to the 
theories of merger motives suggested by various famous researchers in the M&A field (e.g., 
David and Sim, 1986; a comprehensive review by Trautwein, 1990). Further, we document 
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CoBO as a superior policy framework that promises healthier economic life for declining 
industries, and attracts foreign investment as a vehicle for economic growth whilst a 
dynamite to control monopoly trade. Selectively, it promises employment opportunities in 
small and medium enterprises, which are prosperous channels for country’s robust trade, and 
industry intensification.  
Conceptually, contractual buyout is a twofold-secured debt obligation, collective 
ownership, joint administration, and thereby provides opportunity to buy a target unit in the 
given period between acquirer, target firm, and financier in the market for corporate control. 
It shall turns-on while signing an agreement by the parties. Exclusively, it is a takeover 
defensive tactic, and opportunity to get tax advantage via creating CoBO deal. In particular, 
CoBO would be efficient inorganic magnetic for international VCs and PEs as a part of 
foreign market entry strategy. Specifically, CoBO would be best-fit model for cross-border 
M&A integration strategy. From the employee perspective, it ensures employability through 
signing a CoBO deed with sick/loss-making units. Since, it seems to be a futures contract in 
the capital market; conversely, it regulates unhealthy competition via monitoring monopoly 
activities.  
CoBO propositions are useful in various implications, such as information symmetry 
and administrative changes, employment and employee role, operating performance and 
financial arrangement, tax savings, choice of market entry strategy, integration strategy, and 
government and policy makers. In addition to this, we also describe CoBO would be takeover 
defensive strategy, and it can stay away from the economic shocks. In meticulous, we have 
not been narrow-downed to design subjective and numerical illustrations of the proposed 
model, and consequences of planning, execution and administration in CoBO deal have been 
ignored. Therefore, the above two issues are the promising need of contractual buyout model 
to implement ironically in the industry whilst putting-up in the practice. As a contribution, 
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and advancement to theory in the M&A arena, proposed CoBO framework shall open the 
avenues for future research contributors by raising various issues related to that does it 
differentiates other models. We recommend global VCs, and PEs choose CoBO as 
investment vehicle to avail the competent business opportunities in both emerging, and 
budding economies. Promising need of investment in product based industries include auto 
ancillary, dairy and dairy products, and textile, silk and cotton, likewise services include 
infrastructure development, state road transportation, and university/higher education. Our 
inorganic-strategy framework and propositions may also provide some implications for MNE 
executives, and recommendations for further research. 
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Fig 1. Contractual Buyout (CoBO) model 
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